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Affordance Theory: A Rejoinder to ‘Musical events and perceptual ecologies’ by Eric Clarke et al 
 
Conventional scientific writing depends upon a highly proscribed complement of models and 
formulae with clearly defined methodological constraints. In “Musical Events and Perceptual 
Ecologies,” Eric Clarke, whose work lies between musicology and music psychology, seems to 
prefer a strategy of free induction grounded in thick descriptions of musical experience which, 
while perhaps broadly phenomenological in spirit, are never bound by its technicalities. His tone is 
compassionate and holistic, and his illustrations often privilege the immediate personal reflections 
of listeners who would otherwise be relegated to the margins of mainstream musicological analysis. 
He draws upon a range of repertoire which is decidedly progressive, linking classical standards with 
anything from free improvisation to electronic dance music. As a psychologist he seeks to identify 
universals, but the sense of the universal one gets from his writing is remarkably plural. In this 
sense he inhabits a space between the sciences and the humanities which is arguably quite unique to 
the social psychology of music in Britain, a body of research mainly conducted in arts rather than in 
science faculties, often funded by arts rather than science research councils. Clarke may seek 
universals, but his universe is plural and resists prescription. 
 
What universal could be more plural and less prescriptive than affordance? Clarke’s core concern 
with boiling down the ways listeners grasp, reflect upon and use music in terms of ephemeral, 
relational, ecologically-situated affordances stems from a long series of publications, going back 
nearly two decades in his work and that of his students (Clarke 2005; Windsor 2004; Dibben 2001). 
The article in question does little to extend this body of work, which left me with the impression 
that Clarke expects his reader to take affordance as established orthodoxy, the explanatory power of 
which is no longer contested. This is at least strongly implied by Clarke’s use of the term ‘law’ to 
describe the ways affordances are ‘specified in’ the information that listeners detect in musical 
sound. There seems to be nothing we can do with music that isn’t afforded by our immediate 
interaction with it. And yet most arguments in support of the theory underscore its apparent power 
to evade the limits to our perception associated with mediating factors like mental representation or 
material inscription. I find this paradox intriguing. 
 
The earliest use of affordance I have seen in the music literature comes from Clarke’s 
contemporary, the sociologist Tia DeNora, in her book Music in Everyday Life. Responding to an 
analysis of the opera Carmen by musicologist Susan McClary, DeNora seeks an empirical solution 
to the question of whether the music’s gendered connotations are ‘immanent’ or ‘arbitrary’ (DeNora 
2000, 24). She finds a middle way, concluding that, while it is impossible to determine the work’s 
meaning absolutely for all listeners, an individual listener’s interpretations can be understood as 
concrete efforts to appropriate the music as a resource for self-expression or self-construction 
(DeNora 2000, 43-44). The advantage she sees in the concept of affordance is that it conserves the 
margin of freedom that makes each musical experience unique. They do so because they are 
situated effects of the relation between object and user, and not inherent properties of the object that 
it imposes upon users independently of their action. DeNora appears to have been so convinced of 
the value of this insight that she claims it as her own innovation. In a brief passage outlining the 
history of the concept she seems to suggest that affordances were originally conceived as inhering 
in objects independently of the user’s perspective (DeNora 2000, 40). 
 
A bit of history shows how just wrong this is. Affordance theory has its roots in the wartime 
research of American psychologist James J. Gibson. During and directly after the Second World 
War, Gibson was employed in a series of military programs, first in the Flying Training Command 
and later in the Motion Picture Research Unit of the Aviation Psychology Program, the objective of 
which was to understand and assess the visual aptitude of pilot applicants and develop effective 
training films (Hochberg 1994, 154). Epistemological links to a first-order cybernetic worldview are 
no coincidence. The main advantages of affordance theory can be expressed as responses to the 
same pragmatic challenges that inspired Gibson’s contemporaries like Norbert Wiener and Gregory 
Bateson: its emphasis on dynamic instrumental mastery, its support for the ideal of homeostatic 
self-regulation, and its openness to a sufficiently broad range of purposeful tests. Gibson insisted on 
a holistic, relational account of perception, in which motivations and intentions emerge from the 
dynamic flux of situated activity. He was fully aware of the implications of his approach, and of the 
broader conversations to which it contributed. His theory speaks to his deep commitment, shared 
widely among cybernetic thinkers, to the radical empiricism of William James, which he had 
encountered at Princeton through his teacher Edwin Bissell Holt (Hochberg 1994, 152; Peters and 
Peters 2016). This commitment was strengthened in reaction against the ideas of Gestalt 
psychologist Kurt Koffka, who Gibson encountered during his first teaching appointment at Smith 
College in 1928. Koffka was convinced that the reason things looked as they do lay in the 
imposition of ‘field forces’ by the central nervous system on the raw data given through the senses. 
While he shared Koffka’s disdain for behaviourism, Gibson took the implicitly Jamesian position 
that experience must always arise in the thick of relation, and could never be reconstructible from 
raw sensory data (Hochberg 1994, 153; James 1907). 
 
Psychologists today, of course, work with practical and conceptual limitations that William James 
in his day could not have foreseen – for one thing, the margin for speculation is far smaller than it 
once was. The pragmatist insistence on the plural and indeterminate (or better, to borrow a term 
coined by Michel Serres, pandeterminate) nature of causality would be difficult to reconcile with 
contemporary methods, surely just as difficult as it would have been for Gibson to put into action in 
the course of his military research. It can hardly be surprising, then, that Gibson chose to bind the 
theory of affordances to the direct, immediate relation between perceiver and object – it is difficult 
to imagine any higher level of complexity being useful for the production of a pilot training film. 
Clarke adopts a similar constraint with respect to music. Wherever wider, interpersonal (perhaps 
also more abstract) sources of meaning such as culture, history or politics come into play, he is 
satisfied to explain them by the same homeostatic endeavour of immediate action-perception: these 
are just more diffuse examples of the ‘wind’ that blows across the surfaces of autonomous, 
information-seeking organisms as they make their way through a fundamentally interconnected 
world, the meaningfulness of which can be presumed in advance.  
 
This is where the theory of affordances and philosophical pragmatism seem to part ways. The 
literature on musical affordances frequently portrays listeners’ engagement with culture as a kind of 
‘hunting’ that takes place in a world structured in terms of opportunities and utilities (Windsor and 
de Bézénac 2012, 115). But it makes sense from a pragmatist perspective to question whether 
scaling up the immediate encounter between subject and object does in fact lead to a sufficiently 
holistic account of cultural experience. Cultures, if they exist as empirical objects at all, must 
operate beyond the threshold where individual adaptive action can have direct causal effects. Gary 
Tomlinson’s recent (2013) work on the evolution of musical behaviour invites us to think of culture 
as ‘uncoupled’ from direct selective pressures. If enculturation boils down to exposure to unitary 
forces in the environment, then our awareness of it is limited to the individual ‘niche-making’ 
behaviours of the ‘participants’ in our neighbourhood. 
 
Moreover, reducing culture to a set of desirable opportunities to which one adapts through exposure 
seems to me to exclude forms of enculturation, such as formal education and training, that, while 
presumably universal as far as human culture is concerned, are not necessarily appealing to the 
participants and not necessarily oriented towards immediately meaningful concerns or utilities. It 
also short-circuits any critical contestation that might be raised over the meaning and utility of the 
things that people have been taught. As Clarke explains, the meanings that occur to different 
interpreters of the same object are the result of the different ‘affordances’ that arise from their 
different information-seeking grasps on that object. Although contestation is probably, again, a 
universal aspect of human enculturation, affordance theory leaves little room for criticising or 
reconsidering what other people think an object means – no person’s perception can be wrong, only 
insufficient (cf. Fodor & Pylyshyn 1981, 153-155). If sufficient perception is equivalent to correct 
perception, then what is directly available to us in the environment must always be correct, and thus 
incontestable. It matters from a pragmatist perspective, however, that we be able to understand even 
the most naturalistic picture or recording not simply as a document of or vehicle for unmediated 
perception, but as expressing qualities or telling stories in a way that is mediated by the maker’s 
instruments, and may not be true or good (Dewey 1934, 237). Surely we can reject mentalism 
without rejecting the kind of intellectual judgement that makes this kind of critical distinction 
possible. 
 
I understand that the attempt to encompass culture in an ecological theory of music perception is 
motivated by a desire to move away from putatively more solipsistic ‘information processing’ 
approaches. However, I question whether it is fair to claim that Gibson improves on the account of 
culture offered by information theorists like Leonard Meyer and Abraham Moles. For all the 
problems with his theory, Moles at least has a similar account of the iterative shaping of musical 
objects and subjects, and is keen to place an authentic phenomenology of musical experience above 
purely acoustic representations (Moles 1968, 68). Moving the locus of information from the mind of 
the perceiver to the relational contact between perceiver and music does not seem to me to do much 
to change the constraints of the inquiry or the explanation. Information theory has always been 
relational in this sense. Nor is it really fair to contrast a Gibsonian view with ‘structuralism’ as 
Clarke does. In fact, Clarke’s structuralist strikes me as a bit of a straw figure. Structuralism in 
psychology and the social sciences (e.g. in the work of Lévi-Strauss, Piaget, Chomsky, etc.) is not a 
claim that meaning is fixed in works of art, but rather a claim that we can find basic patterns of 
perception or action that play a generative role in shaping the diversity of human expression and 
experience. This view arises from the same pragmatist and Gestalt precursors that inspired Gibson.  
 
All this would be little more than genealogical quibbling if Gibsonian theory offered some new 
insight into musical listening. At least in Clarke’s article, however, the end goal seems to be to 
naturalise what is effectively a standard European hermeneutic perspective, with musical objects 
working as interfaces between individual and society, which listeners interpret from a perspective 
that is structured against a horizon of sedimented cultural history. In other words it does nothing to 
challenge the normal run of musicological scholarship. There are many ways that the situation 
could be improved without falling into mentalism or prescriptivism. More attention could be paid to 
the broader implications of pragmatist thinking, which has always embraced the existence of 
abstraction, such that concepts, cultures and affects might arise and circulate independently from 
the direct encounter between subject and object. We would be in very dangerous territory if 
meaning was simply a matter of what is immediately natural and useful to us. What is especially 
worrying, however, is the tendency in the Gibsonian literature to put down as ecological only 
‘flourishing’, ‘active’ and ‘comfortable’ types of behaviour. The goodness of nature is not self-
evident. Psychologised narratives of harmonious empathy and connectedness in no way exhaust the 
possibilities for musical experience, and more importantly they provide a convenient source of 
support for the kind of domesticated, conforming, ‘pro-social’ affectivity demanded by network 
capitalism (Slaby in preparation). And they certainly put us no closer to changing our circumstances 
on a scale larger than our immediate niche, which, now more than ever, is the kind of action that an 
ecological theory should be able to address. 
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